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CHAPTER 1 
1.1. Introduction 
The nature of a receipt or accrual gained by an individual taxpayer on the disposal of an asset 
is of significant importance for income tax purposes. This consideration can be classified as 
either ‘capital’ or ‘revenue’ as envisaged in the definition of ‘gross income’ in terms of the 
Income Tax Act.1 The relevant excerpt of the definition provides that gross income includes 
receipts and accruals received by a taxpayer…‘excluding receipts and accruals of a capital 
nature.’2  
The consequence of this exclusion is that a taxpayer may dispose of an asset and the amount 
received from such disposal will be excluded from his gross income. Therefore, the taxpayer’s 
liability for income tax towards the fiscus will be reduced. For this exclusion to apply, however, 
the asset disposed of must have been a capital asset. It must be noted, however, that a taxpayer 
will not escape tax liability entirely for the gain received upon the disposal of a capital asset. 
Capital gains tax, which is dealt with in the Eighth schedule of the Act will still be payable. A 
‘capital gain’ is defined as:  
‘A person’s capital gain for a year of assessment, in respect of the disposal of an asset 
during that year, is equal to the amount by which the proceeds received or accrued in 
respect of that disposal exceed the base cost of that asset.’3  
A further exposition on capital gains tax and the payment thereof is, however, beyond the scope 
of this dissertation.  
Given the normal tax implications and consequences of the disposal of an asset, it would have 
been expected and necessary for the Act to deal with the concepts of ‘capital’ and ‘revenue’ in 
detail. However, the Act is silent on how these terms should be defined and applied.  
It is, therefore, necessary to turn to local and foreign courts for assistance to determine whether 
an asset is capital or revenue nature. Despite the vast array of case law dealing with capital and 
revenue, ‘the subject is still as murky as ever.’4 At best, our courts have provided guidelines 
 
1 Act 58 of 1962 (hereafter referred to as ‘the Act’). 
2 Ibid Section 1. 
3 Ibid Section 3 of the Eight Schedule. 
4 G Urquhart ‘Capital v. Revenue: Some Light in the Darkness’ 1979 Acta Juridica 299. 
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which can be used to determine the capital or revenue nature of an asset without providing one 
infallible test.5 
A common guideline or factor often assessed has been the broad factor of intention. The 
intention of a taxpayer at the time of acquisition of an asset,6 mixed intentions of a taxpayer7 
and a change of intention8 have been discussed and expounded by our courts in determining 
the capital or revenue nature of an asset.  
Further, some courts have considered whether the taxpayer has engaged in business in a scheme 
of profit-making.9 This raises a further inquiry on how this test should be applied. Some courts 
have employed the use of a purely subjective test,10 while other courts have proceeded to 
answer this enquiry by employing an objective test.11 
Regard must also be given to S102(1)(a) of the Tax Administration Act.12 This section creates 
a hurdle for a taxpayer should he wish to challenge the findings of the Commissioner. 
S102(1)(a) provides that ‘the onus is on the taxpayer to prove that an amount is exempt or 
otherwise not taxable.’13 The initial assessment provided to a taxpayer is regarded as being 
prima facie correct.  
‘The taxpayer must then prove on a balance of probabilities that he was not engaged in 
a scheme of profit-making and that the income derived from the sale of the asset was 
therefore capital in nature and not taxable.’14  
The varying factors, guidelines, tests and how these tests should apply has resulted in 
uncertainty in determining the true nature of an asset.  
1.1. Statement of purpose 
The purpose of this dissertation is to critically analyse the broad definitions of ‘capital’ and 
‘revenue’ as used in the Act.15   
 
5 CIR v Pick n’ Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust 1992 (2) SA 245 (AD), 3 of Smalberger J para 2. 
6 Willcox v CIR 1960 (4) SA 599 (AD). 
7 African Life Investment Corporation (Pty) Ltd v SIR 1969 (4) SA 259 (AD). 
8 Natal Estates v Secretary of Inland Revenue 1975 (4) SA 177 (AD). 
9 Note 5 above, 19 of Nicholas AJA judgment para 1. 
10 Ibid, which was evident from the judgment of Smalberger J. 
11 CSARS v Wyner 2003 (4) SA 541 (SCA), which was evident from the majority judgment. 
12 Act 28 of 2011. 
13 Ibid. 
14 AW Oguttu ‘The courts will not be beguiled : schemes of profit-making concealed as capital in nature exposed’ 
2003 Jutas Business Law 230-233.  
15 Note 2 above. 
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This dissertation will attempt this analysis by first discussing what makes an asset ‘capital’ and 
what makes an asset ‘revenue’. Regard will then be given to earlier case law which has dealt 
with the concepts of capital and revenue. There will be a review of the factual background of 
these cases and an analysis of the reasoning used by these courts in arriving at their respective 
decisions. 
This dissertation will then critically analyse the factor of ‘intention’ when used to establish the 
capital or revenue nature of an asset. Regard will be given to the intention of the taxpayer on 
acquisition of an asset, mixed intentions and a change of intention. 
This dissertation will then provide a focused and detailed critical assessment of leading and 
current case law which has dealt with various factors, considerations and tests in determining 
the capital and revenue nature of an asset. There will also be a discussion on how these tests 
have been applied. 
1.2. Rationale for study      
This dissertation seeks to achieve greater certainty regarding the capital and revenue nature of 
an asset and how these assets can be so categorised. This study is significant because the tax 
implications of having proceeds generated from the sale of an asset classified as either capital 
or revenue, has far reaching tax consequences for an individual taxpayer as well as the fiscus. 
As will be shown in this dissertation, there is a vast array of approaches, tests, guidelines and 
factors which have been considered when making a distinction between capital and revenue. 
While a vast array of scenarios and approaches provide a broader scope on the topic of capital 
versus revenue, it does little to provide certainty and clarity to all parties considered.      
It is therefore necessary to attempt to streamline the various approaches and tests to the topic 
under consideration to provide greater certainty and clarity to taxpayers, the fiscus and the legal 
fraternity at large.  
1.3. Research questions 
Main research questions 
  
1. How to determine the capital or revenue nature of an asset for Income Tax purposes? 
 Research sub-questions 
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(i) How do different factors affect the nature of an asset? 
(ii) Is there a dominant factor which determines the nature of an asset? 
(iii) Is there a test that can be used to determine the nature of an asset? 
(iv) Should the application of a test be objective or subjective? 
 
1.4. Methodology 
This dissertation will be a qualitative analysis of ‘capital’ and ‘revenue’ in terms of the Act. 
 
There will be an analysis of the definition of ‘gross income’ in terms of the Act with specific 
reference to capital and revenue. This will be analysed first because the Act is a primary source 
and it is the charging legislation applicable to the research topic. 
 
Historical case law as well as current case law dealing with capital and revenue will then 
follow. This will be undertaken so that the reader understands what has been held historically 
compared to what the current position is. These cases can then be compared and contrasted 
against each other so that the conclusion which will follow will be adequately supported. 
 
Throughout the research, reference will be made to various academic literature which have 
dealt with the concepts of capital and revenue. I will then advance the argument of the relevant 
literature and then provide a critique and analysis of the literature. I will also discuss how this 
literature is applicable to the current discussion. 
 
1.5. Chapter breakdown 
The chapters covered in my dissertation will be as follows: 
• Chapter 2 – Capital and Revenue as defined in terms of historical case law 
The definition of capital and revenue in terms of the Act will be discussed. I will highlight the 
problem of the Act being silent on the definitions of these terms. I will argue that the lack of a 
definition of these key concepts has created uncertainty in the minds of taxpayers, tax 
practitioners and the legal fraternity at large.  
I will go into detail with a vast number of historical case law which have dealt with capital and 
revenue. I will set out the facts of these cases, the outcome of each case and the reasons for the 
judgment. This chapter will be subdivided under various sub-headings. Under these sub-
headings, I will discuss applicable case law and journal articles.  
11 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to highlight what has been held historically. The reader will also 
be made aware of the lack of certainty and coherence when the terms of capital and revenue 
are in issue.  
I will then conclude this chapter by linking it to my third chapter which will be a discussion on 
a landmark case which has come up with a test on determining the nature of an asset.  
• Chapter 3 – A critical discussion on the scheme of profit-making test 
I will discuss CIR v Pick n’ Pay Share Employee Trust.16 I will critically discuss the judgment 
by discussing the facts of the case, what was argued, what was held and the reasons for same. 
I will also analyse and discuss the minority judgment herein.  
I will argue that the approach adopted herein is accepted by the author and I will support this 
submission based on the majority judgment as well as journal articles.  
• Chapter 4 – A move away from a subjective test to an objective test 
I will discuss CSARS v Wyner.17 I will critically discuss the judgment by discussing the facts 
of the case, what was argued, what was held and the reasons for same.  
I will discuss the scheme of profit-making test. In doing so, I will highlight how the court 
moved away from the approach adopted in Pick n’ Pay18 in that an objective test was favoured. 
I will further critically analyse the reasons for this new approach.  
I will then conclude this chapter by discussing the facts of this case and how the taxpayer 
merely disposed of her house to her best advantage and only after she was forced to do so. This 
conclusion will also serve as a link to my next chapter in which the courts appear to have 
reverted to Pick n’ Pay.19 
• Chapter 5 - A critical discussion on CSARS v Capstone 556 (Pty) ltd  
I will critically discuss Capstone.20 My dissertation will discuss the facts of the case, what was 
argued, what was held and the reasons for same.  
 
16 Note 5 above.  
17 Note 11 above. 
18 Note 5 above. 
19 Ibid.  
20 CSARS v Capstone 556 (Pty) Ltd 2016 (4) SA 341 (SCA). 
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I will highlight how the court in this matter appears to have reverted to the Pick n’ Pay21 
subjective test approach as opposed to the objective test preferred in Wyner.22 
• Chapter 6 – Conclusion 
My dissertation will conclude by providing a brief summary of what was discussed in the body 
of my dissertation. I will offer my own opinion based on the literature and case law that was 
discussed. I will seek to answer the issues raised in my introduction and I will also seek to 
provide solutions to my main research question and my research sub-questions. 
 
CHAPTER 2 – CAPITAL AND REVENUE AS DEFINED IN TERMS OF 
HISTORICAL CASE LAW 
2.1. Introduction 
‘Capital’ and ‘revenue’, in relation to the nature of an asset, are terms which have vexed legal 
academics and our courts for decades. These terms are synonymous with uncertainty because 
of the void left by the Act in that no definition is provided. There have been a number of tests, 
guidelines and factors put forth by academics, scholars and our courts to ascertain the capital 
or revenue nature of an asset.  
Before a discussion on these tests and guidelines is followed, however, it is prudent to discuss 
what makes an asset a capital asset and what makes an asset a revenue asset. 
Emslie23 briefly distinguishes the key elements of a revenue asset and a capital asset. He argues 
that if the asset subject to the dispute is part of the income producing machine or structure of 
the taxpayer, then the proceeds realised by the sale of such an asset will be capital in nature.24 
However, if the asset is held with a speculative intention, and it is subsequently ‘used in a 
scheme of profit-making, then the proceeds realised from a sale thereof will be revenue in 
nature.’25  
In CIR v George Forest Timber Company Limited26 the taxpayer was the owner of land which 
had a natural forest on it. The taxpayer’s business concerned the felling of trees which were 
 
21 Note 5 above. 
22 Note 11 above. 
23 TS Emslie ‘ITC 1427: Options and the sale of the subject matter thereof – A triumph of substance over form’ 
(1988) 248 De Rebus 529-531.  
24 Ibid.  
25 Ibid. 
26 1924 (AD) 516. 
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sawn up in its mill and then sold as trading stock. The issue to be determined was whether the 
proceeds gained from the disposal of the timber were of a capital or revenue nature. In reaching 
its decision, the court described ‘capital’ as being wealth used for the production of fresh or 
new wealth (which is revenue).27 The court also drew a distinction between fixed capital and 
floating capital.28 The court stated that fixed capital is not consumed or lost during the 
production of income.29 Fixed capital remains intact.30 Floating capital, however, disappears 
or is depleted in the production of income.31    
It is not a requirement for an asset to be a tangible asset in order for same to be either capital 
or revenue. This was highlighted in CIR v Visser.32 The taxpayer herein acquired mining 
options on a farm. However, these options had lapsed before he could exercise them by 
searching for mineral deposits on the farm. Despite the options having lapsed, the taxpayer was 
convinced that he could acquire options once more owing to the influence which he had had 
over the other farmers in the area. The taxpayer then contracted with a third party to assist him 
in obtaining mining options. In exchange for his assistance, the taxpayer would obtain shares 
in the third party’s company. The court had to then determine whether the value of the shares 
so acquired were of a capital or revenue nature.  
In reaching its conclusion, the court held that income can be said to be a product of a person’s 
wits and energy.33 The shares received were regarded as being such a product owing to the 
influence of the taxpayer. The shares were thus regarded as being revenue nature and, as result 
thereof, had to form part of the taxpayer’s normal income. 
The distinction between ‘capital’ and ‘revenue’ can be accurately surmised by the fruit and tree 
analogy as described in CIR v Visser.34 The tree herein represents capital which remains intact 
and is the source of creation of wealth. Whereas the fruit represents revenue which has been 
produced for commercial sale. The proceeds gained from the disposal of the fruit are 
subsequently revenue in nature.35 
 
27 Ibid, 522. 
28 Note 27 above, 524. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 1937 (TPD) 77. 
33 Ibid, 82. 
34 Note 32 above, 81. 
35 Ibid.  
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However, it is submitted, that the distinction between ‘fruit’ and ‘tree’ is sometimes a difficult 
distinction to be made. Factors which make an asset capital in the hands of one taxpayer, may 
not necessarily result in the same asset being regarded as capital in the hands of a different 
taxpayer. Therefore, it is submitted, the inquiry must proceed further and the facts and 
circumstances of each case must be considered holistically in order to determine the true nature 
of an asset.  
This submission is supported by Overseas Trust Corporation Ltd36 where it was held: 
‘It was pointed out in Commissioner of Taxes v Booysen’s Estate (1918, A.D., p. 576) that the 
profit resulting from the sale of an asset might be either capital or income, according to the 
circumstances. If the transaction were a mere realisation of capital at an enhanced value, the 
entire proceeds would remain capital; but if it were an act done in the ordinary cause of the 
vendor’s business, then the resulting gain would be income. The reason for the distinction is 
clear. Where an asset is realised at a profit as a mere change of investment there is no difference 
in character between the amount of enhancement and the balance of the proceeds. But where 
the profit is, in the words of an eminent Scotch Judge, see Californian Copper Syndicate v 
Inland Revenue (41 Sc.L.R, p.684), ‘a gain made by an operation of business in carrying out a 
scheme for profit making,’ then it is revenue derived from capital productively employed, and 
must be income.’ 
This case37 highlights the point that the capital or revenue nature of an asset should be 
determined in light of the facts of a particular case. There must be an assessment of whether 
what was done was simply a disposal of a capital asset at a greater value or whether the taxpayer 
has engaged in a scheme of profit-making.  
As submitted, there have been numerous factors which have been introduced into the debate 
regarding the capital or revenue nature of asset. However, there is one factor which remains 
constant in the majority of cases and writings. This is the factor of intention. ‘Intention’ in itself 
has raised further issues when determining the capital or revenue nature of an asset. 
The intention of a taxpayer at the time of acquisition of an asset, his intention while holding 
the asset, whether there was a change of intention prior to the disposal of the asset, whether the 
asset was held with mixed intentions and if so, what should be regarded as the taxpayer’s true 
intention as well as the taxpayer’s intention at disposal of the asset, have all raised further 
 
36 1926 (AD) 444, 452-453. 
37 Ibid.  
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complexities in the pursuit of establishing a test for determining the capital and revenue nature 
of an asset.  
It is therefore necessary to analyse and discuss the factor of intention and how this factor has 
been used to determine the capital or revenue nature of an asset.  
2.2. The intention of a taxpayer at the time of acquisition of an asset 
Tsatsawane38 highlights the importance of a taxpayer’s intention at the time of acquisition of 
an asset. He argues that while intention at the time an asset is acquired is important, it is not a 
decisive factor since there might have been a change in intention. If the original intention was 
to acquire the asset and then resell it at a profit, then the profit flows from the productive use 
of capital employed.39 Therefore, the proceeds from the sale will fall into the taxpayer’s gross 
income.40 If, however, the same asset is acquired by the taxpayer and is held not for the purpose 
of reselling it at a profit, then the proceeds from a subsequent disposal will be capital in 
nature.41 
While it is accepted by the author that the intention of a taxpayer is not necessarily decisive, it 
is submitted that his intention is the most important factor when determining the true nature of 
an asset. 
This argument is supported by Vorster.42 He argues that the intention of a taxpayer at the time 
of acquisition of the asset is generally decisive. In order for an asset to be capital in character, 
the taxpayer must show that the asset was acquired with an intention to hold same with a degree 
of permanence.43 However, this does not mean that the taxpayer must rule out any possibility 
to subsequently sell the asset.44 In gauging this intention, the courts will have regard to the 
surrounding factors of a case and they will not rely solely on the ipse dixit of the taxpayer.45  
It is submitted that the views expressed by Vorster46 advances the argument of this dissertation. 
Special attention is given to the submission that the taxpayer may have the possibility in mind 
that he may dispose of his capital asset in the future. The mere fact that he subsequently does 
 
38 K Tsatsawane ‘Receipts or accruals of a capital nature’ (2000) 8(2) Jutas Business Law 40-99. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 L Tager & H Vorster ‘Law of Taxation’ 1986 Annual Survey SALJ 512 – 513. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
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so does not render the proceeds gained thereto as being revenue in nature. This is in line with 
the decision of John Bell47 and Stott48 which will be discussed further in this paper. Further, it 
is accepted by the author that while intention is generally the most important factor to consider, 
which intention is guided by the ipse dixit of a taxpayer, this ipse dixit must be scrutinized 
against the facts and circumstances of each case.   
 The submission that intention is the most crucial factor when seeking to establish the capital 
or revenue nature of an asset is also supported by leading case law. This was discussed in 
Visser.49 In determining the nature of an asset, the court held: 
• ‘Regard must be given to the nature of the transaction and the intention of the taxpayer 
at the time of acquisition of the asset in question.’50  
• While a taxpayer’s intention at the time of acquisition of an asset is not necessarily 
decisive, it is always of utmost importance when determining whether profit gain from 
a subsequent sale of the asset is merely capital appreciation or revenue in nature.51 
• A taxpayer’s intention is not determined by his ipse dixit alone. Rather, his intention is 
established by paying due regard to all of the facts of a matter.52  
Tsatsawane53 is of the view that in determining the intention of a taxpayer, regard should be 
given to his conduct shortly after the acquisition of the asset in question. He argues that if the 
asset is held as a fixed asset or the asset is put to productive use to gain an income, then the 
proceeds are capital in nature.54 Conversely, the asset will be regarded as floating capital or 
stock-in-trade where such asset is acquired by a taxpayer with an intention to resell same for a 
profit.55 Under these circumstances, the proceeds so realised are then regarded as being revenue 
in nature.56 He goes on to qualify these submissions by stating that these are not tests but they 
are mere guidelines.57 Further, a court decision should be based on good commercial sense.58  
 
47 John Bell & Co (Pty) Limited v SIR 1976 (4) SA 415 (A). 
48 CIR v Stott 1928 (AD) 252. 
49 Note 27 above. 
50 Ibid, 81. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid.  
53 Note 32 above. 
54 Ibid.  
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
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It is submitted that the qualifying text by Tsatsawane,59 that the conduct of a taxpayer shortly 
after the acquisition of an asset is merely a guideline, is an important qualification to have been 
made. The reason for same is that this submission is based on the concept of time. The conduct 
of a taxpayer shortly after purchasing an asset could be to hold the asset as an investment asset 
for many years. However, disposal of this asset on a grand scale, with extensive development 
and marketing, could result in the nature of the asset being converted from capital to revenue.60 
Under these circumstances, the proceeds from a disposal will be regarded as being revenue in 
nature.61 This is despite the fact that the asset was held as an investment asset for many years 
prior to its disposal. Conversely, an asset acquired and held for a short period and subsequently 
disposed of owing to an extraordinary offer does not necessarily render the proceeds thereto as 
being revenue in nature.62 This is in spite of the short time between acquisition and disposal. It 
is to this end, that it is submitted, that it is prudent for a court to evaluate the facts and 
surrounding circumstances of each case as opposed to timing or good commercial sense, which 
are merely guidelines.   
The intention of a taxpayer when an asset was being acquired, was discussed in Stott.63 Stott 
had bought and sold various plots of land over a thirty-year period. Two of these sales formed 
the subject matter of a dispute with the Commissioner.  
The first was a large plot of land in Ifafa. Stott was looking to purchase a beach cottage. 
However, there were no small plots available for sale. Therefore, Stott purchased a large plot 
of land and subdivided the land into smaller plots. He kept one of these plots for his beach 
cottage and sold the rest of the smaller plots at a profit. 
The second was a fruit farm which Stott had also subdivided into smaller plots and sold at a 
profit.  
The Commissioner argued that Stott, in cutting up and selling the properties, had embarked in 
a scheme of profit-making with the land being used as trading stock. Therefore, the proceeds 
so realised should form part of the taxable income of Stott. 
The court held: 
 
59 Ibid. 
60 Note 8 above.  
61 Ibid.  
62 ITC 1427 50 (SATC) 25. 
63 Note 42 above. 
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• A taxpayer may invest in land, goods or any other asset. Further, he is also at liberty to 
dispose of such assets to the best of his advantage. The fact that he does so does not 
convert what is a capital asset into a trade for the purposes of earning profits.64  
• When an inquiry is concerned with the activities of a company, even a single transaction 
entered into by the company may be a transaction done with a business intention. 
However, there must be an element of continuity before it can be said that an individual 
is engaging in business activities.65  
• When determining whether disposing an asset merely represents a change of investment 
or whether said disposal is tantamount to engaging in business activities to generate a 
profit, regard must be given to all of the facts and circumstances peculiar to the matter 
under consideration.66 
• ‘In determining the capital or a revenue nature of an asset, one must look at the intention 
of the taxpayer at the time of acquisition of the asset as well as at the time of disposal.’67 
‘This is necessary since there may have been a change of intention.’68 
• The intention of a taxpayer is an important factor to consider. ‘In the absence of any 
other factors showing that the taxpayer had engaged in a scheme of profit-making, his 
intention will be the conclusive factor in determining the nature of an asset.’69   
Stott70 is significant because it provides authority for taxpayers to dispose of capital assets to 
their best advantage without having the proceeds received forming part of their gross income.   
The case is also authority for the general principle that single transactions entered into by 
individual taxpayers are indicative of capital disposal as opposed to a business intention. While 
this is accepted by the author, caution must be exercised when applying this principle. If, for 
example, a taxpayer buys a motor vehicle and he subsequently disposes of it, it could be argued 
(provided that he is not a motor dealer) that he has engaged in a single transaction. Therefore, 
any profits realised ought to be capital in nature. If, however, the taxpayer strips the vehicle 
and sells each part individually, each transaction entered into by the taxpayer could be regarded 
 
64 Note 42 above, 281. 
65 Note 42 above, 260. 
66 Note 42 above, 257. 
67 Note 42 above, 262. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
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as forming part of a business in a scheme of profit-making. It is, therefore, submitted that the 
factors of intention and nature of the asset must also be considered in an inquiry of this nature.  
Further, it is significant to note that the asset in dispute can be adapted to the market in which 
the disposal will take place. Therefore, a taxpayer intending to dispose of a capital asset is not 
prevented from altering the form of the asset before disposal. 
Finally, the case highlights the importance of intention and it is authority for intention being 
the most significant factor to consider when seeking to establish the capital or revenue nature 
of an asset. If there are no other factors indicating the existence of a business activity being 
pursued, the taxpayer’s intention will be the conclusive factor in establishing nature of an asset.    
Following Stott,71 the court in Paul72 had to determine whether profits made from the sale of 
land were capital or revenue in nature. The intention of the taxpayer herein was to purchase a 
small plot of land for himself. However, the owner of the land was unwilling to do so and 
required that the taxpayer purchase at least one hundred and sixty-seven acres of land. The 
taxpayer went ahead with the sale. However, he intended to sell off the surplus land. This 
generated a profit for the taxpayer which the Commissioner sought to tax on the basis that the 
taxpayer had engaged in business activities.  
In finding that the profits earned were capital in nature, the court held: 
• The dominant purpose of the taxpayer was to acquire a small plot of land for his own 
purposes.73 
• There was no intention at acquisition to make a profit.74 
This case is of importance as it amplifies the point an assessment of intention is crucial when 
establishing the capital or revenue nature of an asset. The mere fact that profits are earned on 
disposal of an asset is not enough for the asset to be regarded as a revenue asset. There must 
be a genuine business intention by the taxpayer to engage in a scheme of profit-making.  
In Elandsheuwel Farming (Edms) Bpk v SBI75 the intention of a company had to be determined. 
The taxpayer had been involved in farming activities. These farming activities were initially 
undertaken by one of its shareholders before the farm was leased. The tenants of the farm also 
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used the property for farming activities. The shareholders then resolved to sell their shares in 
the property and the value of the company’s shares were based on the property being designated 
as agricultural property. The new shareholders had expertise in property development. A year 
later, the new shareholders procured the company to sell the property to the local municipality 
and a significant profit was gained from the sale. The issue in dispute was whether the proceeds 
of the sale were capital or revenue in nature.  
The court held: 
• Whether proceeds earned from disposing of an asset constitutes gross income or not 
requires an inquiry into whether the sale amounted to disposal of a capital asset or 
whether the sale was done in the course of carrying on a business in a scheme of profit-
making.76 
• ‘If there was a single transaction undertaken by the taxpayer, the inquiry is limited to 
the alternatives of capital realisation or a profit-making scheme.’77   
• The new shareholders engaged in a scheme to make a considerable profit when they 
had acquired the shares in the farm based on the agricultural value.78 
• The intention of the shareholders should be attributed to the company itself.79 
• The company’s intention with regard to the land had changed when the new 
shareholders assumed control of the company.80  
It is submitted that the principle that the intention of the shareholders should be attributed to 
the company is accepted by the author. However, the reasoning of the court in arriving at its 
decision is open to critique as this is contrary to the principles of Stott.81 The dissenting 
judgment herein provides that the inquiry should focus on what the company actually did as 
opposed to what the background of the shareholders were. This approach is accepted by the 
author. 
Further, the nature of the sale herein was straightforward which further pointed to the fact that 
the taxpayer merely sold the land to the best of their advantage as opposed to engaging in a 
business activity.  
 
76 Ibid, 103. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Note 42 above. 
21 
 
2.3. Change of intention by a taxpayer 
While it is accepted by the author that simply alienating a capital asset to a taxpayer’s best 
advantage does not necessarily render the profits thereto as being revenue in nature, it is 
submitted that this will not always be the case. Ferreira82 submits that situations may arise when 
a change of intention by a taxpayer may result in the character of an asset, previously held a 
capital asset, being changed into that of trading stock. Ferreira83 highlights that the consequence 
of this change is that a higher tax (normal tax) will be imposed on the proceeds gained on the 
disposal of the asset. Had the nature of the asset not been changed, capital gains tax would have 
been imposed which is at a lower rate than normal tax.84 
Uys85 argues that there where there is a disposal of an asset, which was being retained as capital, 
there should be an inquiry into the taxpayer’s behaviour prior to his acquisition of the asset as 
well as an inquiry into his actions in relation to the asset while same was being held. This will 
assist the courts in establishing the intention of the taxpayer when the asset was subsequently 
disposed.86 
The taxpayer’s own ipse dixit, as submitted by Uys,87 is an important factor to consider when 
determining the true intention of a taxpayer. However, the ipse dixit of a taxpayer will not be 
accepted without consideration of objective factors which need to support what the taxpayer 
alleges.88 The taxpayer will be unable to discharge the onus placed on him unless his ipse dixit 
is corroborated by objective factors in his favour.89  
It is submitted that the above argument is accepted by the author. The point to amplify herein 
is that there are two legs of the inquiry when determining the nature of an asset. The first leg 
should be to establish the subjective intention of the taxpayer, which will primary be gauged 
from his ipse dixit. Once this has been established, the inquiry should shift to determine whether 
said ipse dixit is supported by objective factors. This approach is a considered approach in that 
a holistic inquiry is made as opposed to a narrow approach, one which is skewed in favour of 
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the Commissioner (a purely objective inquiry) and the other which favours a taxpayer (a purely 
subjective inquiry).   
Our courts have demonstrated that it is only so far that a taxpayer can go before his actions will 
have the effect of converting what was a capital asset into a revenue asset. This is illustrated in 
Natal Estates Ltd v SIR.90  The taxpayer, a company in this case, owned several farms in and 
around the La Lucia and Umhlanga areas. The company’s primary business was the growing 
of sugar cane and the manufacture of sugar. There were concerns that the land owned by the 
company would be expropriated by government for public benefit. The directors resolved to 
develop and market the land for residential purposes. In pursuance of this activity, the company 
appointed engineers, architects and marketers. The developed land was then sold off by the 
company at a profit. The Commissioner had taken the view that the proceeds thus earned were 
revenue in nature.   
It was held: 
• When determining the nature of profits made from the sale of an asset, the taxpayer’s 
primary intention to hold onto the asset for investment purposes is an important factor 
to consider. However, such intention is not necessarily decisive as there could have 
been a change of intention. This could arise when considering the method of 
realisation.91  
• In order to determine whether a matter is concerned with realising a capital asset on the 
one hand or, conversely, embarking in a scheme of profit-making by selling land, regard 
must be given to the all the facts of the matter in relation to the usual commercial 
concept of conducting business with a profit-making motive.92  
• Some of the facts mentioned above which will be considered include: the intention of 
the owner when the land was acquired and at the time of disposal of the land, the 
purposes of the owner; in the case of a company; the owner’s activities in relation to 
the land prior to disposal and the nature and extent of his marketing operations.93  
In light of the grand scale of development, marketing and disposal, it was accepted that the 
company had changed their intention from investment to speculation, with the land being 
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treated as stock-in-trade. The proceeds from the disposal of the land so realised were thus 
subjected to normal tax.  
Prior to this decision, the leading authority dealing with the disposal of a capital asset was 
Stott.94 Therefore, the taxpayer herein could be forgiven for thinking that they could develop 
the land and dispose of same on such a large scale without there being tax implications on the 
subsequent profits gained. It is submitted that the guidelines enunciated herein are only some 
of the factors to consider. In disputes of this nature, a considered and fair approach would be 
to consider all of the facts and circumstances of a case. This will ensure that a balance is struck 
between disposing of a capital asset to the taxpayer’s best advantage and engaging in business 
activities in a scheme of profit-making.  
Natal Estates95 can be distinguished from Berea West Estates (Pty) Ltd v SIR96 to show 
instances where a capital asset can be disposed of profitably without such profits being subject 
to normal tax. 
The taxpayer herein was a realisation company which was formed for the purposes of selling 
land. The land was held in a testamentary trust. The administration of the trust proved to be 
difficult which culminated in the winding up of the estate spanning some twenty years. The 
executors of the estate were under pressure to wind up the estate. It was for these reasons that 
the land was transferred from the trust to a company so that the land could be sold. The 
beneficiaries of the deceased estate became shareholders in the company and the profits from 
the sale of the land were to be distributed to them accordingly. However, the land could not be 
sold as a whole and it was agreed to subdivide the land into smaller plots and to then dispose 
of these individual plots. The modus operandi of the company was that it would develop a plot 
of land and then sell same profitably. The profits so realised would then be used to develop and 
sell another plot of land. This continued for around twenty years. It was then for the court to 
consider whether the proceeds from the sale of the plots of land were of a capital or revenue 
nature.  
The Commissioner argued that the land had been purchased with the object of selling it at a 
profit. Therefore, the profits realised were of a revenue nature. The taxpayer argued that it had 
merely acted as a realisation company. Therefore, the proceeds realised were of a capital nature.  
 
94 Note 42 above. 
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The court held: 
• Regard must be given to the reasons for the incorporation of a company, its 
memorandum of association and its subsequent conduct in order to determine whether 
the enterprise was acting as a realisation vehicle or whether the enterprise was formed 
to conduct a business in the pursuit of earning a profit.97  
• Where a company is formed to realise an asset, and does no more than realise the asset, 
the proceeds generated from the sale of the asset are not taxable as trading profits. 
However, if the company conducts its affairs in a manner which shows that it is carrying 
on a business, using the asset in question in furtherance of the business, then any 
proceeds earned by disposing the asset shall be deemed revenue.98   
It was held that, having regard to the totality of facts, the appellant was a realisation company 
formed purely to further the interests of the beneficiaries by selling land. Therefore, the 
proceeds gained from the disposal of land were capital in nature. 
It is noted that the argument put forth by the Commissioner herein was an objective approach 
with a narrow application. The argument of the Commissioner was not incorrect. However, it 
is submitted, that the inquiry had to proceed further than this. The approach adopted by the 
court incorporated both subjective and objective elements, which is accepted by the author. 
The court showed that it also did not accept the taxpayer’s version in isolation. Their version 
was only accepted after it was corroborated by objective factors. This was achieved by firstly 
establishing the reason for the company’s incorporation and thereafter assessing their actions 
to determine whether their sole purpose was to sell a capital asset or to engage in a profit-
making scheme. The evidence adduced herein was clear to suggest that the taxpayer’s sole 
purpose was to dispose of a capital asset as their activities in relation to the land did not involve 
large scale development as was the case in Natal Estates.99 
Emslie100 discusses a change of intention by a taxpayer to dispose of an asset previously held 
as a capital asset by analysing Sam v Commissioner of Taxes101 and ITC 1427.102 
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Sam103 was concerned with the activities of a mining company. The company had acquired an 
option to purchase a total of sixteen mining claims. The company proceeded to conduct surveys 
on these claims in order to determine their economic value. The company then agreed to sell 
all of the claims to a newly formed company after it became apparent that it lacked the 
necessary funds to embark on profitable mining operations. The company was a 50 per cent 
shareholder in the new company. The company then took the decision to exercise the options 
held to acquire the mining claims and these were then immediately transferred to the new 
company. The issue to be determined was whether the proceeds of the sale of the claims were 
of a capital or revenue nature. In finding that the accruals were of a revenue nature, the court 
held that the company had changed their intention. This had occurred when the option was 
exercised only for the subject matter of such option to be sold immediately. The court held that 
this was evidence of a scheme of profit-making being undertaken.  
Emslie104 correctly points out that this is indicative of form being accepted by the courts over 
substance. The consequence of this is that taxpayers face the possibility of having proceeds 
acquired from the sale of property acquired under an option being subjected to normal tax.105 
The court in ITC 1427,106 however, was of the view that the matter should be decided on 
substance over form. The taxpayer herein entered into a lease agreement with a company which 
owned a farm. All of the shares in the company were held by a third party. One of the terms of 
the lease agreement was that the taxpayer was given an option to purchase either the farm or 
all of shares in the company. After a year of entering into the lease agreement, the taxpayer 
was approached by an estate agent to purchase the farm for R700 000.00. The taxpayer 
thereafter exercised his option to purchase all of the shares in the company for R165 000.00. 
He then sold these shares to the estate agent on the same day for R700 000.00. The court had 
to determine whether the taxpayer had engaged in a scheme for profit when he exercised his 
option to acquire the shares in the farm-owning company only to re-sell them immediately at a 
profit. 
The court held that the intention of the taxpayer at the time when he had acquired the option 
was of significance. Based on the facts of the case, it was found that option acquired was as a 
capital asset. The subsequent sale of this asset only took place when the taxpayer herein was 
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presented with an offer which he could not refuse. Therefore, the taxpayer had not engaged in 
a scheme of profit-making.    
ITC 1427107 is significant for taxpayers as it sets out the authority on disposal of a capital asset 
shortly after acquisition without having the proceeds deemed revenue in nature. The case also 
highlights the point that regard should be given to the substance of a disposal as opposed to the 
form which is accepted. This subjective approach advances the argument of this paper.   
 
2.4. Mixed intentions 
Circumstances do sometimes arise in which a taxpayer acquires an asset with a mixed or dual 
intention. A dual intention arises when a taxpayer acquires an asset as an investment. However, 
the possible disposal of the asset at a later stage is not entirely ruled out.  
Where situations such as these arise, the onus will be on the taxpayer to show that his dominant 
or main purpose in acquiring the asset under consideration was for investment purposes. If a 
taxpayer is unable to prove what his dominant intention was, he will not be able to prove that 
his dominant purpose was to acquire the asset for investment purposes. This is in accordance 
with African Life Investment Corporation.108 The appellant company herein had a dual purpose. 
The first was to trade as a share-dealing company and the other was to build up a portfolio of 
shares which, it was hoped, would earn dividends. In accordance with its share-dealing 
activities, the company sold shares and realised a profit. The issue to be determined was 
whether the gains realised thereto was of capital or revenue. In finding against the taxpayer, 
the court held that there was no dominant purpose into which the share-dealing activities of the 
taxpayer could be absorbed as merely incidental.109 The share-dealing activities of the taxpayer 
was regarded as having being part of the business structure of the taxpayer company. Therefore, 
the gains received when the shares were disposed of were revenue in nature.  
To this end, it is submitted, that the inquiry is split into two. The first is an analysis and proof 
of the existence of an investment. The second is the earning of profits or a gain being made. 
The profit earned must be an incidental by-product in order for same to escape normal tax 
implications. Where the profit is part and parcel of the investment activities of the taxpayer, or 
such profit is sought after by the taxpayer, such profit will form part of the taxpayer’s normal 
income.  
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A change of intention to sell an asset which was being held as capital, will not be enough to 
render the proceeds thereto as being revenue in nature. Something more will be required. This 
was discussed in John Bell.110The appellant was a company carrying on business in premises 
which it owned. The company then relocated and it was agreed that the premises will be sold. 
However, the property market was not thriving at the time and it was agreed that the property 
will be rented out until the property market was conducive to selling the property profitably. 
The rental of the property continued for some eleven years until the property market had 
improved. As a result of this improvement, the property was sold at a profit. The court had to 
then determine whether the proceeds from the sale were subject to normal tax.  
The court held: 
• The nature of an asset cannot change from capital to revenue simply because a taxpayer 
delays in disposing same owing to unfavourable market conditions.111 
• A change of intention to sell a capital asset, does not render the resultant gain revenue. 
There must be something more done in order to change an asset from capital to revenue 
so as to render the resultant proceeds revenue.112 
It is submitted that the taxpayer herein simply waited for the most opportune time to dispose 
of the property. It was primarily for these reasons that the proceeds of the sale were regarded 
as being capital in nature. However, the outcome may well have been different had the taxpayer 
made improvements and altered the character of the asset during the period of waiting. The 
inquiry would then have turned to discuss whether the asset was adapted to the market to the 
taxpayer’s best advantage, as was the position in Stott113 or whether the taxpayer had engaged 
in business in a scheme of profit-making considering the manner of the disposal, as was the 
outcome of Natal Estates.114 
Solomon115 discusses the factor of intention with specific reference to a taxpayer whom has 
mixed intentions. The article discusses this by making reference to two decided cases. It is 
 
110 Note 41 above. 
111 Note 41 above, 103. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Note 42 above. 
114 Note 8 above. 
115 J Boltar & P Solomon ‘Law of Taxation’ 1997 Annual Survey SALJ 2003. 
28 
 
noteworthy to compare and contrast ITC 1608116 and CIR v Nel117 as both cases involved the 
disposal of valuable commodities, diamonds and Kruger Rands respectively.  
In ITC 1608118 the taxpayer purchased diamonds. The taxpayer alleged that he did not have a 
clear intention with what he was going to do with the diamonds. He stated that he had thought 
that he would either sell them at a future date or that they would pass on to his heirs. The 
taxpayer subsequently sold some of the diamonds at a profit. He alleged that the reason for the 
sale was a combination of family pressure and also because he needed capital for a business. 
The issue to be determined was whether the profits so realised were of a capital or revenue 
nature. The court was of the view that the reasons put forth by the taxpayer for the sale were 
not credible. The court held that the matter should be determined by assessing the intention of 
the taxpayer when he had acquired the diamonds.   
The court also drew a distinction between goods purchased for the purposes of re-selling same 
at a profit and goods purchased as an investment where the purpose is not to re-sell same at a 
profit. The latter may be contemplated by a taxpayer but this is not the purpose for which the 
asset is acquired. 
In finding in favour of the Commissioner, the court held that it could not be said that the 
diamonds were purchased to generate an income for the taxpayer. Further, it could also not be 
said that the diamonds were purchased as a hobby. Therefore, the proceeds from the disposal 
of the diamonds were of a revenue nature.  
In Nel,119 the taxpayer stated that he had purchased Kruger Rands as a hedge against inflation. 
He attested that he had intended that the Kruger Rands will be passed to his children. The 
taxpayer subsequently exchanged some of the Kruger Rands because of the taxpayer’s need to 
purchase a vehicle for his wife. This transaction realised a profit which the Commissioner 
sought to tax. 
The court considered the facts and circumstances which led to the transaction entered into by 
the taxpayer. It was held that the sale was done under duress in that it was unusual and 
unexpected. There had been no intention by the taxpayer to make profit by disposing of the 
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Kruger Rands. Rather, same was exchanged for the acquisition of another capital asset which 
was the motor vehicle for his wife.  
In ITC 1608,120 however, the sale was deemed to be designedly sought for with a profit motive. 
Further, the nature of the asset sold indicated that this asset could never have been bought for 
its bare use or as a hobby. Therefore, the nature of the asset could not be said to be capital.  
Both of the abovementioned cases advance the argument of this dissertation. They illustrate 
that certain assets, although similar in nature, do not necessarily render them the same from an 
income tax point of view. Each case must be adjudicated upon based on its own facts and 
circumstances. This argument can be advanced by referring to the facts of ITC 1608.121 The 
asset under consideration herein was diamonds and the court had stated that it could not be said 
that the asset had been purchased as a hobby. While this may be accepted from the facts 
established in this particular case, it could be argued that a person with an adoration for 
diamonds did in fact purchase a diamond in furtherance of this passion. Any proceeds gained 
from a subsequent sale, it is submitted, would be of a capital nature as there was no profit 
motive when the asset had been purchased. This is also contingent on the manner of disposal 
not being done as a business with a profit-making scheme. In light of the above, it is submitted 
that each case should be considered in light of the facts and circumstances of each case as was 
the position in Nel.122 
It is also important to note that both cases used subjective tests which were corroborated by 
objective factors. The respective courts looked at the intentions of both taxpayers when the 
assets were purchased. The court also considered the factors and reasons for the disposal of the 
asset in order to determine the nature of the proceeds received. It is this considered and holistic 
approach which is advanced by this dissertation.  
2.5. Conclusion  
In any legal inquiry, factors play an important role. It is of importance to establish what these 
factors are and how they have been interpreted by our courts and academia. As illustrated in 
this chapter, intention is such factor in an inquiry discussing the capital and revenue nature of 
an asset. The facts of each case must be assessed to determine whether the inquiry should focus 
on the intention of the taxpayer at acquisition of the asset, the mixed or dual intention of a 
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taxpayer or whether there was a change of intention by the taxpayer. While not being decisive, 
the established intention of a taxpayer will greatly assist when determining whether an asset is 
of a capital or revenue nature.  
The formulation of legal tests also aids our courts, academia and prospective litigants in various 
disputes. The scheme of profit-making test is the test most associated with a dispute over the 
capital and revenue nature of an asset. However, application of this test has not been uniform. 
There is uncertainty regarding what exactly this test entails, what factors are considered in the 
application of the test and whether the application should be subjective or objective in nature. 
It is, therefore, of importance that an examination of the scheme of profit-making test is 
undertaken. 
 
CHAPTER 3 – A CRITICAL DISCUSSION ON THE SCHEME OF PROFIT-MAKING 
TEST 
3.1. Introduction 
The scheme of profit-making test was used in the majority judgment in the landmark case of 
CIR v Pick n’ Pay.123 This test seeks to inquire whether the actions of the taxpayer show that 
he has engaged in a business venture in a scheme of profit-making. If the facts support this 
conclusion, the profits earned by the taxpayer will be regarded as being revenue in nature and 
same will form part of his normal income. The application of the scheme of profit-making test 
is subjective in nature. However, this has not always been the approach adopted by our courts.  
Vorster124 makes reference to ITC 1413125 which employed the use of an objective test in 
establishing the capital or revenue character of an asset. The facts herein were similar to that 
of Pick n’ Pay126 in that a trust was formed to enable employees to purchase shares from the 
company that they worked for. The Commissioner sought to tax the proceeds derived from the 
sale of shares by the trust. The taxpayer advanced the application of a subjective test and argued 
that the proceeds received were of a capital nature because there was no intention to make a 
profit. However, in finding in favour of the Commissioner, the court made use of an objective 
test. The court found that the shares were purchased at market value and it could be expected 
 
123 Note 5 above. 
124 L Tager & H Vorster ‘Law of Taxation’ 1986 Annual Survey SALJ 488. 
125 1985 48 (SATC) 167. 
126 Note 5 above.  
31 
 
by the trust that when the shares were subsequently sold, they would realise a profit. In light of 
the invariable profit that the trust would make, it was held that the trust was carrying on a trade 
resulting in the profits subsequently earned being regarded as revenue in nature.  
It is submitted that the outcome of ITC 1413127 was incorrect. The application of the test ought 
to have been of a subjective nature. Pick n’ Pay128 did not follow this approach and there was 
an adoption of a subjective test. This chapter seeks to demonstrate why this is the correct 
approach to follow. 
3.2. CIR v Pick n’ Pay analysed 
It is of importance to analyse this case in order to fully understand how the scheme of profit-
making test should be applied. 
Facts 
The respondent herein resolved to form a trust. The trust was to operate as a vehicle through 
which employees of the respondent could purchase shares in the company. The duties of the 
trustees were to purchase shares from the company, to receive applications from employees to 
purchase shares in the company, to sell shares in accordance with the scheme rules and to 
administer the scheme.  
The employees would pay for the shares within ten years of its purchase or it could be settled 
between the fifth and tenth anniversary if the employee wished to do so. If an employee was 
dismissed before the fifth anniversary of the purchase owing to dishonesty or fraud, the trust 
could purchase the relevant shares which would then form part of the property of the trust. 
Shares were acquired by the trust in three ways: 
1. Shares which had been purchased by employees whom wished to realise their holdings, 
2. If shares were forfeited as a result of dismissal because of dishonesty or fraud or if the 
employee left the company within five years of the initial purchase,   
3. Purchasing the shares on from the market when the trust did not have enough shares 
available to employees. 
The share-dealing activities of the respondent showed that a profit was made during the four 
years of assessment. Profits were earned as a result of forfeited shares having a higher market 
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value at the date of forfeiture rather than at the date of acquisition. The profits realised accrued 
to the trust.  
Issue 
The Commissioner contended that the profits earned by the trust were revenue in nature and 
should form part of the respondent’s normal income. The respondent argued that the profits 
earned were purely fortuitous in nature and were not intentionally worked for. Therefore, the 
profits were capital in nature.  
Held – Nicholas AJA (Minority Judgment) 
• ‘The tests for the phrase ‘of a capital nature’ provide no more than guidelines. Each 
case must be decided on its own facts.’129 
• ‘The proceeds from a sale of capital asset, even at an enhanced value, remains capital 
in nature. However, if the acts which led to the earning of the profits were done in the 
ordinary course of the taxpayer’s business, the resultant gain would be revenue in 
nature.’130     
• ‘The shares purchased by the trust were never purchased to be held. Therefore, they 
were regarded as floating capital and the subsequent realisation amounted to realisation 
of floating capital. Therefore, it could not be said that receipts were capital in nature.’131 
• ‘The Special Court had erred when determining the issue after accepting that the trust 
did not acquire and dispose of the shares in pursuance of a scheme of profit-making. 
This was not the correct test to apply herein. Following the series of transactions entered 
into by the trust, the correct test to be applied was whether the activities of the trust 
amounted to a trade or business.’132   
• ‘It is accepted that the trust did not carry on business in the ordinary sense of the word. 
However, the fact remained that the trust was concerned with trading in shares and not 
in realising investments.’133  
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Held – Smalberger JA (Majority Judgment) 
• ‘There have been various tests and guidelines postulated when determining whether a 
receipt is capital or revenue in nature. However, these are guidelines only. There is no 
single infallible test to apply.’134  
• ‘Conducting a business in pursuit of profits requires an assessment of the taxpayer’s 
purpose and objectives. The dominant purpose of the taxpayer will be assessed in 
circumstances where more than one purpose is apparent.’135  
• ‘A profit motive is not conclusive when determining whether a business is being carried 
on or not. However, the presence or absence of a profit motive is an important factor to 
consider.’136  
• ‘In a tax case, one is not concerned with what the taxpayer had contemplated. There 
must be an assessment of the objectives of the taxpayer, his aim and his actual 
purpose.’137 
• ‘The trust only bought shares when it was obliged to do so and sold shares when it was 
required to do so. This is not a practice associated with ordinary commercial 
practice.’138  
• ‘The trustees did not intend and seek to make a profit. This was not their motive.’139 
• ‘There was no intention of the trust to engage in the business of buying and selling 
shares. The purpose of the trust was to act as a conduit for qualifying employees to 
purchase shares in the company.’140  
• ‘The receipts sought to be taxed by the Commissioner were never worked for or 
intended. Rather, they were a consequence of the activities being carried on by the trust.  
Therefore, the receipts could not be said to be income in nature and were thus 
capital.’141   
It is of significance to analyse both the minority and majority judgments above. It is intriguing 
to note that both judgments were in agreement with many issues. A significant concession 
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made by both judgments was that a taxpayer is at liberty to dispose of a capital asset, even at 
an enhanced value, without the proceeds being of a capital nature.   
However, the essential differences between the judgments were the different tests applied and 
how these tests were applied. The minority judgment sought to address the issue by applying 
the activities test objectively. The difficulty of applying such test is that it goes against earlier 
case law such as Stott, 142 Elandsheuwel143 and Berea West Estates.144 All of these decisions 
adopted a subjective test and were concerned with whether a profit-making scheme was 
adopted by the taxpayer.  
Applying an objective test also fails to consider the individual circumstances of the taxpayer. 
There are numerous reasons why a taxpayer would dispose of a capital asset. It is submitted 
that it is prudent to consider these factors when determining whether the taxpayer was truly 
engaged in a business in a scheme of profit-making.   
The majority judgment adopted the scheme of profit-making test and this application was 
subjective in nature. It is submitted that this is the correct approach and this approach advances 
the argument of this dissertation. The pivotal assessment of the majority lay in the analysis of 
the intention of the taxpayer. This is purely subjective in nature and its application showed that 
there was no profit intention by the taxpayer. Further, this subjective intention is not the same 
intention as dealt with in criminal law. The focus is rather on the purpose or reason why the 
taxpayer engaged in the relevant transaction.  
It must be noted, however, that the surrounding circumstances and the rules of the scheme were 
considered by the majority. Therefore, it is evident that while the decision fell to be considered 
on a subjective basis, this was still informed by considering objective factors. It is submitted 
that this is the method which should be adopted in considering the capital or revenue nature of 
proceeds of an asset.  
3.3. Academic analysis  
The reasoning and outcome of Pick n’ Pay145 has generated debates on whether the majority 
were correct in their approach.  
 
142 Note 42 above. 
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A scheme of profit-making has been discussed by Olivier.146 In her discussion, Olivier147 
discusses three cases and illustrates how matters with different factual backgrounds should be 
interpreted and applied in terms of their own facts to determine whether a taxpayer has engaged 
in a scheme of profit-making.  
ITC 1755,148 as discussed by Olivier,149 illustrates how the disposal of a capital asset will not 
render the proceeds received thereto as being revenue in nature. ITC 1755150 shows that 
proceeds from the disposal of property will not be regarded as being revenue in nature when 
the disposal was done under duress.  
This reasoning advances the argument trying to be established by this dissertation in two ways. 
Firstly, that the subjective mind of a taxpayer must be considered in determining whether he 
has engaged in a scheme of profit-making. Objective factors must be considered. The ipse dixit 
of a taxpayer should not be accepted without an analysis of objective factors. However, the test 
should be subjective in nature. Secondly, the mere realisation of a capital asset does not 
automatically render the proceeds gained as being revenue in nature. The proceeds should only 
be revenue in nature when the taxpayer has crossed the Rubicon151 and he has engaged in a 
business in a scheme of profit-making.  
Williams152 uses a case study to determine whether the proceeds from a disposal of an asset, 
previously held as a capital asset, will be capital or revenue in nature. She argues that the 
absence of one infallible test will mean that an asset regarded as capital in the hands of one 
taxpayer will not necessarily be regarded as capital in the hands of another taxpayer.153 
Williams154 argues that ‘whether or not proceeds of a sale are capital or revenue will be 
determined by a basic enquiry as to whether there was a scheme of profit-making.’155 The 
intention of the taxpayer is seen as central in determining whether an amount will be regarded 
as capital or revenue.156 This assessment will be subjective in nature.157 Williams158 argues that 
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the judicial approach in determining this intention is to look at the taxpayer’s intention at 
acquisition, during the time when the asset was held by the taxpayer and on disposal. However, 
Williams159 argues that in principle, intention should only be determined when the asset is 
disposed of by the taxpayer. Williams160 argues that the determination that has to be made is 
twofold. Firstly, the courts will hold an inquiry which will seek to determine the capital or 
revenue nature of the receipt.161 Thereafter, it will be for the taxpayer to prove that his intention 
was to dispose of a capital asset.162  
Williams’ article is of relevance because she highlights the importance of a subjective test in 
determining the intention of the taxpayer. However, the limited assessment of this intention (at 
the time of disposal of the asset) can be critiqued. It is submitted that a broader judicial 
approach is favoured to account for a possible change of intention by the taxpayer.  
The scheme of profit-making test was also discussed by Joubert.163 Joubert164 examines the 
‘profit-making scheme test’, ‘fixed versus floating capital’ and ‘trading and trading stock’.  In 
criticising the profit-making scheme test, Joubert argues that the majority whom decided Pick 
‘n Pay165 failed to consider the definition of ‘trading stock’ as defined in the Act. In so doing, 
he is of the view that the court came to the wrong decision.166 He suggests that it would be 
more appropriate to consider whether there is an intention to use the asset as trading stock as 
opposed to whether there is a scheme of profit-making.167 
While Joubert does raise a valid argument in his paper, it is evident that he does not adopt a 
subjective test. Rather, he adopts a more objective approach and limits the inquiry to the nature 
of the asset and whether same will be regarded as trading stock. This narrow approach will be 
a dangerous precedent to set as the facts of Pick n’ Pay168 show that there was no trade in the 
ordinary commercial sense of the word. Therefore, it is submitted, it would be superficial to 
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stamp the nature of the shares in that case169 as revenue assets and the proceeds thereto as 
revenue. 
Jooste170 argues that Pick n’ Pay171 marks a landmark victory for the application of a subjective 
test when an inquiry is held to establish the nature of an asset. Inasmuch as this approach is 
accepted by Jooste,172 the author rightly brings to attention the obiter dictum remarks of 
Smalberger JA, 
‘A different conclusion might have been justified if the making of profits was inevitable. But 
this was not the case.’ (at page 10, para 2)  
This statement is criticized on the basis that if profits are inevitable, they will be regarded as 
revenue because profits had been foreseen.173 Jooste174 submits that if this qualification is 
accepted, the application of same to the facts of Pick n’ Pay175 would result in the proceeds 
being regarded as revenue in nature. This is because the probabilities of making a profit would 
have been inevitable from the onset.  
The issue raised by Jooste is accepted by the author. The statement by Smalberger JA appears 
to be at odds with the rest of his judgment. Further, this statement goes against the principles 
as laid down in earlier decisions such as Stott.176   
It is submitted that the making of profits has never been the determining factor when 
considering the capital or revenue nature of an asset. It is a factor to consider but the presence 
of a profit does not necessarily deem the proceeds revenue in nature. Rather, the inquiry has 
always been to examine the manner in which the proceeds were received and the actions of the 
taxpayer.  It is, therefore, submitted that the remarks of Smalberger JA herein are incorrect. 
Perhaps this interpretation is not what Smalberger JA had intended when read against his entire 
judgment. The statement could relate to the activities and purpose of the taxpayer. Smalberger 
JA could have intended to mean that if the activities and purpose of the taxpayer was to engage 
in a business to make a profit as a whole, then the resultant proceeds would be revenue. 
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However, it is conceded that this is not a prima facie interpretation and is rather read in to fit 
into the rest of his judgment.  
Boltar177 argues that a purely subjective inquiry when assessing the nature of an asset has not 
been an approach adopted with haste by our courts. Rather, the decision is informed by 
considering a range of factors relevant to a specific case.178  The author argues that the starting 
position should be that the taxpayer’s intention is conclusive.179  Factors other than intention 
should only be relevant in ascertaining the stated intention of the taxpayer.180 
The author agrees with Boltar181 in that the courts are reluctant to endorse a purely subjective 
test. 
It will be expected that the taxpayer will provide a version of events which will favour himself. 
It is submitted, therefore, that the adoption of a purely subjective test may lead to unfairness to 
the Commissioner. However, the solution put forth by Boltar182  is not accepted by the author 
in its entirety. As submitted, the version put of the taxpayer will, more often than not, be a 
version designed to achieve his desired outcome. This outcome will be for profits being 
regarded as capital in nature as opposed to revenue. The over reliance on his intention and 
deeming same to be decisive, will skew the inquiry to the taxpayer’s favour. Further, this 
approach is contrary to the onus placed on the taxpayer. Oguttu,183 in discussing the onus on a 
taxpayer, rightly suggests that:  
‘…the Commissioner’s assessment is correct until the taxpayer can prove on a balance of 
probabilities that he was not engaged in a scheme of profit making and that the income derived 
from the sale of the asset was thus capital in nature and not taxable.’ 
Proceeding as suggested by Boltar184  will have the effect of the onus of proof being placed on 
the Commissioner because the starting position will be that the intention of taxpayer is decisive. 
It will then be for the Commissioner to argue that the ipse dixit of the taxpayer should not be 
accepted. It is submitted that intention may be regarded as the most important factor to consider 
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in an inquiry of this nature. However, regarding same as decisive may be placing an over 
reliance on this factor.  
Olivier185 discusses the ‘profit-making scheme test’, ‘fixed versus floating capital’ and the 
‘fruit versus tree analogy.’ Olivier186 argues that disposal of the asset itself (the tree) will be 
regarded as disposal of a capital asset. Therefore, the proceeds will be capital in nature.187 
Conversely, disposal of what is produced by the asset (the fruit) will be regarded as being 
revenue in nature.188  
Olivier then analyses the factor of intention in acquiring and disposal of an asset.189 To this 
extent, it is submitted, that while the ipse dixit of a taxpayer is important, it will not necessarily 
be decisive. Olivier suggests that the starting point should be to question whether there is an 
intention to engage in a scheme of profit-making.190 ‘This should be determined by the facts of 
the case and regard must be had to the possibility of a change of intention by the taxpayer.’191 
‘Such change of intention (to dispose of an asset held as capital) will not necessarily stamp the 
proceeds thereto as revenue.’192 The facts of a case will determine whether the change of 
intention by the taxpayer had been so drastic that the capital nature of an asset has now been 
metamorphosed to revenue.193  
Olivier’s article is of value because in making out her argument, she suggests that a subjective 
test appears to be favoured. Objective factors are to be considered; however, those objective 
factors must then be used to determine the taxpayer’s subjective intention. This is in keeping 
with the majority judgment in Pick n’ Pay.194 
3.4. Conclusion 
It is submitted that both subjective and objective factors should be considered in determining 
the true nature of asset. The taxpayer’s subjective intention is of great consideration. However, 
it is vital that objective factors relevant to a specific case must support the subjective intention 
of the taxpayer.  
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It is submitted that the majority in Pick n’ Pay195 arrived at the correct decision as the inquiry 
took into account all of the facts and circumstances of the case. This analysis revealed the true 
purpose and motive of the scheme, which was at all times to benefit the employees and to retain 
employees. There was never an intention to pursue a business in order to make a profit. 
Inasmuch as this is a subjective inquiry, the taxpayer still had to testify and explain why they 
did what they did. This intention was then tested against objective factors in order to support 
the subjective intention of the taxpayer. 
The argument by the minority, that the shares were purchased not to be held therefore it 
constituted floating capital, can be criticised. It is submitted that this is a superficial 
interpretation and an inquiry of this nature must assess the matter at a fundamental level. The 
author accepts that the shares were never purchased to be held as an investment. However, the 
assessment must proceed further and there must be an inquiry as to why were the shares 
purchased. Had the minority considered this, it would have been evident that the shares were 
being purchased for and on behalf of qualifying employees and not in furtherance of any 
business interest of the trust. Therefore, the shares could not be said to be floating capital which 
is ordinarily disposed of to generate income and profits for the person making the disposal. 
This was clearly not the intention of the trust.  
While it is submitted that Pick n’ Pay196 is the accepted approach, the new millennium brought 
with it a new challenge for taxpayers wishing to dispose of a capital asset. In a landmark case, 
Wyner197 illustrated that the courts have reverted to applying an objective test in determining 
the capital or revenue nature of an asset. This proved to be challenge to taxpayers as even the 
disposal of the family home could be deemed a business venture.  
It is, therefore, of importance to analyse why the courts have reverted to an objective 
application and whether this approach is correct.   
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CHAPTER 4 – A MOVE AWAY FROM A SUBJECTIVE TEST TO AN OBJECTIVE 
TEST 
4.1. Introduction 
It is submitted that the principles of Pick n’ Pay198 brought with it a degree of certainty 
regarding the capital or revenue nature of an asset. The decision brought together the various 
factors and tests. The case199 was imperative in highlighting that the factor of intention was the 
most crucial factor to consider when seeking to determine the capital or revenue nature of an 
asset. Further, the subjective application of the scheme of profit-making test was the accepted 
application of the test. This appeared to be the correct approach given that this application 
encompasses both the interests of the taxpayer and the Commissioner without one having an 
unfair advantage over the other. 
However, the principles of Pick n’ Pay200 were not followed by the court in Wyner.201 This 
court202 applied the scheme of profit-making test objectively. It is submitted that this is the 
incorrect application of the scheme of profit-making test. The purpose of this chapter is to 
critically analyse Wyner203 to support the contention that the court should not have moved away 
from the principles enunciated in Pick n’ Pay.204  
4.2. CSARS v Wyner analysed 
Facts  
The respondent was a lessee of a property situated in Clifton. Ownership of the property vested 
in the Council of the City of Cape Town (hereinafter ‘the Council’). However, lessees were 
entitled to build bungalows on the property and they were also entitled to dispose of the 
bungalows. If a bungalow was disposed of, the buyer would enter into a lease agreement with 
the council.  
The respondent and other lessees were then given the option to purchase the properties they 
currently leased or to enter into a twenty-year lease with the Council if they chose not to make 
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the purchase. The price for the respondent’s bungalow was set at R802 000.00. The options 
available to the respondent were to either: 
1. Purchase the property for R802 000.00. 
2. Rent the property for a period of twenty years with rental payable at market rates. 
3. Vacate the property. 
The respondent could not afford to purchase the property or to pay the monthly rental.  
The respondent was then approached by Investec to enter into a finance agreement which 
would enable the respondent to buy the property and then sell it. The relevant clause of the 
agreement read: 
‘…Wyner are purchasing their Clifton Bungalow with a view of selling it within a year. The 
deal that we have put together gives them the opportunity to capitalise all charges and interest 
during the year and settle the loan in one lump sum when the property is sold.’  
By entering into the finance agreement with Investec, the respondent would also be able realise 
improvements which she had made on the property. The property was subsequently purchased 
by the respondents in October 1994. In March 1995, the property was listed for purchase and 
was then sold in September 1995 for R2 850 000.00.  
Issue 
The issue to be determined was whether the respondents had engaged in a scheme of profit-
making when they had sold their bungalow and whether the profits realised were thus revenue 
in nature.  
Respondent’s argument 
The respondent argued that amount generated from the sale were capital for the following 
reasons: 
• The purchase price set by the Council was not something which the respondent worked 
for. Rather, this proved to be a fortuitous decision made by the Council which the 
respondent could not control.  
• The respondent accepted that she might have to sell the property soon after purchase. 
However, this did not make her a speculator of property whom was engaged in a scheme 
of profit-making.  
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• Her primary intention was not to make a profit. Rather, she merely attempted to make 
the best of a bad situation and dispose of the property which she could no longer afford, 
repay her loan and acquire a similar property which she could afford.   
Held 
In reaching their decision, the court held that: 
• ‘The respondent obtained financial assistance in order for her to purchase the property 
so that she could hold it while she attempted to sell it.’205 
• ‘The purpose of the purchase was to sell same within twelve months with the intention 
of making a profit.’206 
• ‘The respondent enlisted the services of an estate agent soon after the purchase 
indicating her objective of making a profit.’207 
•  The property was not purchased with the intention that the respondent would live in it. 
• ‘A distinction must be drawn between the making of the discounted offer, which clearly 
was fortuitous, and the acquisition of the property for resale, which was anything but 
fortuitous.’208 Therefore, the proceeds were held to be revenue in nature. 
4.3. Critique of CSARS v Wyner 
The reasoning of the court in Wyner209 shows that the court moved away from the application 
of a subjective test and employed the use of an objective test. It is submitted that this is the 
incorrect approach as the court failed to take into account the reasons of the purchase and 
disposal.  
4.3.1. Duration for which a capital asset is held 
It has been stated that the duration for which a capital asset is held, prior to being disposed of, 
is not an absolute sign of the nature of the proceeds thus received.210 While it is not suggested 
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that the court should not have taken this factor into account, it is submitted that this factor was 
amplified without consideration for the reasoning behind the quick disposal. The court should 
have considered the reasons why the respondent acted in the manner in which she did and then 
assess whether the objective factors of the case support the actions taken by the respondent.  
4.3.2. Profit being made 
The court also found that the making of a profit by the respondent was indicative of a scheme 
of profit-making being carried out. However, this goes against decided case law. Samril 
Investments (Pty) Ltd211 was concerned with the selling of sand at a profit and whether the 
profits so realised were of a capital or revenue nature. The taxpayer argued that they had 
‘disposed of the right to acquire the sand in a single transaction.’212 Therefore, it could not be 
said that they were carrying on business.  
In finding in favour of the Commissioner, the court held: 
• ‘The capital or revenue nature of a receipt was ordinarily determined by inquiring 
whether same was acquired through carrying on a business in a scheme of profit-
making.’213 
• ‘However, profit-making is an element of capital accumulation. Therefore, not every 
receipt resulting from the sale of a capital asset, even though profits were designedly 
sought, is invariably revenue in nature. Each case has to be decided on its own facts.’214 
Even though the taxpayer was unsuccessful herein, the principle to extract from this case is that 
the earning of profits alone does not result in the receipt being revenue in nature. In applying 
this to Wyner215 it is evident that the making of a profit was inevitable given that the price at 
which she acquired the property was so far below market value. However, it is submitted that 
this was not as a result of Wyner having engaged in a scheme of profit-making. If there had 
been an assessment of all the facts and circumstance of the case, as suggested in Samril 
Investments (Pty) Ltd,216 it would be apparent that the profit earned was as a result of 
fortuitousness. The facts further illustrate that the respondent attempted to sell her home only 
after it became apparent that she could no longer afford to live in it. The proceeds realised from 
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the sale were subsequently reinvested by the respondent in another property, which would be 
the respondent’s home. It is submitted that these actions are not indicative of a business 
transaction in a scheme of profit-making. Rather, the actions of Wyner show a taxpayer who 
was merely making the best out of a bad situation.   
4.4. Academic analysis  
Wyner217 has also been a criticized by academics. Williams218 inquires whether a taxpayer 
would be liable for income tax on the profits acquired by him following the sale of his home.  
Williams219 highlights this undesirable effect when considering that the reason for the sale 
could be to provide for retirement savings for the taxpayer. Taxation of the profits gained would 
deplete such savings which would have an adverse effect on the future well-being of the 
taxpayer.220 
Williams221 makes reference to ITC 1616222 to warn taxpayers that even profits made from the 
sale of a family home may be subject to normal tax.  
The taxpayer herein was a medical specialist who had moved to the Cape. His wife had resigned 
from her job owing to the move. The taxpayer then purchased a property that was to be their 
home. However, he was forced to lease the property as he had already entered into a lease 
agreement on arrival in the Cape. The taxpayer’s wife then found employment and they agreed 
that it would be more suitable for them to live closer to her workplace. The taxpayer then put 
the house that he had purchased for sale. The property was subsequently sold at a profit of 
around R47 000.00.  The property had been owned by the taxpayer for about two and a half 
years before being sold. The taxpayer claimed that the profits generated were of a capital 
nature. The Commissioner disagreed with this contention and included the amount in the 
taxpayer’s normal income.  
The court accepted that the reason for the sale of the property was because of the location of 
his wife’s new workplace. In finding in favour of the taxpayer, it was held that the place of 
employment of the taxpayer’s wife was something which he could not control. Therefore, it 
could not be said that the profits made were designedly sought. As a result, the sale was held 
to be a fortuitous disposal as opposed to a scheme of profit-making.  
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Williams223 argues that the key reasons for this decision were that the taxpayer was not 
involved with other transactions of this nature and the court disregarded the existence of a 
possible dual intention by the taxpayer. Further, the court exercised benevolence when 
assessing the reason for the sale.224 The taxpayer’s first response to the Commissioner in 
relation to the sale is open to interpretation. The taxpayer had stated: 
‘The property ... was purchased in order to invest the proceeds of our previous property in 
relation to the current rise in property prices. Our starting point was the supposition that the 
resale value of the property would remain related to the prevailing property prices and that the 
income from letting it would be sufficient to cover the rental of the house in which we live.’ 
Williams225 states that a stricter assessment of the facts could have led a different court to the 
conclusion that the taxpayer had both an investment and speculative intention.  
Williams226 also suggests that the profits would have been subject to normal tax if it was 
purchased to hold and re-sell at a profit, while the taxpayer lived elsewhere, and looked for 
another property to purchase as a home.  
It is submitted that the court in ITC 1616227 reached the correct decision. The taxpayer’s efforts 
in highlighting his capital intention could have resulted in an adverse finding against him. 
However, the author accepts that this was a taxpayer whom was being cautious in responding 
to the Commissioner as opposed to a taxpayer whom was truly engaged in a scheme of profit-
making. 
It is also significant to note that the court herein adopted a subjective test in assessing the nature 
of the profits received. The sale only occurred as a result of extenuating circumstances which 
were beyond the control of the taxpayer.  
It is submitted that this reasoning advances the critique of Wyner.228 The taxpayer herein only 
sold her home when it became apparent that she could not afford to rent the property or to 
purchase same. Further, as was the case in ITC 1616,229 the taxpayer did not engage in similar 
transactions which would have indicated a business intention. Rather, the transaction was an 
isolated sale which served as a means to an end, which was to secure the taxpayer’s future 
place of residence and for her to recoup the value of improvements that she had made on the 
property.  
 
223 Note 169 above. 
224 Ibid.  
225 Ibid.  
226 Ibid.  
227 Note 173 above.  
228 Note 11 above. 
229 Note 173 above. 
47 
 
Oguttu230 inquires whether the actions of a taxpayer amount to a salvage operation or whether 
he has engaged in a scheme of profit-making. It is submitted that salvation arises in 
circumstances when a taxpayer wishes to make the best out of a bad situation and disposes of 
a capital asset. Oguttu231 is of the view that proceeds gained from such a salvation will be of a 
capital nature.  
The author accepts the views as expressed by Oguttu.232 It would be harsh on a taxpayer, whose 
sole intention is to dispose of an asset without any profit motive, to have to bear the 
consequences of the proceeds realised thereto falling within his normal income. It is submitted 
that an inquiry of this nature does not have to go to these lengths which require a taxpayer 
having to argue that the proceeds earned herein are capital in nature. This submission is based 
on the fact that there was never an intention, at acquisition or disposal of the asset, to engage 
in business activities. Absent such business intention, the proceeds earned by a taxpayer would 
be gained from disposal of a capital asset which any person is entitled to do. Given that the 
nature of the asset remains capital, the proceeds realised therein will fall outside the taxpayer’s 
normal income.  
Oguttu233 proceeds to discuss a scheme of profit-making by highlighting the point that if there 
is a purposeful effort by the taxpayer to earn a profit, any subsequent income generated by the 
taxpayer will be revenue in nature. This is distinct from fortuitous profits which are not worked 
for by a taxpayer and will be regarded as capital in nature.234This is also supported by case 
law.235 
However, Oguttu236 highlights the point that the mere fact that a taxpayer makes an effort to 
sell a capital asset at a profit, does not necessarily render the proceeds subsequently gained as 
being revenue in nature. This submission is well supported by case law237 and further amplifies 
the point that each case must be assessed on the facts and circumstances relevant to that specific 
case.238 
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Oguttu239 suggests that some of these surrounding factors are ‘the manner in which the asset 
was acquired,’240 ‘the period for which the asset was owned,’241 ‘the existence of previous 
transactions of the taxpayer and how often these occurred,’242 ‘the nature of the financing for 
the acquisition of the asset,’243 ‘the occupation of the taxpayer’244 and ‘the manner of disposal 
of the asset.’245  
While these are some of the general factors which a court must take into account, the 
occupation of the taxpayer is open to argument, especially in modern society. There are 
circumstances in which professional taxpayers do engage in business dealings. Therefore, it is 
submitted, that the occupation of the taxpayer is irrelevant when determining whether he 
entered into a business transaction. Greater emphasis should be placed on what the taxpayer 
actually did and the reasons, both objective and subjective, for his actions.  
Oguttu246 argues that the disposal of the property in Wyner247 amounted to disposal of an 
investment as opposed to speculation. Further, the taxpayer’s background showed that she had 
not engaged in similar transactions.248 The proceeds earned by the taxpayer were then used to 
purchase another bungalow with the residue being invested by her.249 These actions, Oguttu250 
suggests, demonstrates a change of investment as opposed to a scheme of profit-making.  
Oguttu251 concludes by stating that the facts of Wyner252 demonstrated a salvage operation and 
not a scheme of profit-making. Therefore, disposal of assets under circumstances of salvage 
should not be construed as a scheme of profit-making.253 The proceeds thus earned should be 
regarded as being capital in nature.254 
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The views of Oguttu255 further strengthen the argument that the court in Wyner256 had arrived 
at the incorrect decision. The actions of the taxpayer in Wyner257 did amount to a salvage as 
they resulted from the taxpayer being unable to purchase or rent the property. Therefore, she 
had to take appropriate steps to purchase the property and then dispose of same as a means to 
acquire another permanent property. This was not an ordinary commercial transaction done 
with a view to make a profit. Rather, the profits were put towards a home for the taxpayer’s 
residence with the balance being invested.  
 
4.5. Conclusion 
It is submitted that the outcome of Wyner258 was regressive in its effect. The court failed to take 
into account earlier cases which streamlined the capital versus revenue debate. They also failed 
to consider the scheme of profit-making test in its subjective application. Instead of reinforcing 
this approach and application, it is submitted that the court took a step backward. 
It is submitted that the taxpayer herein disposed of a capital asset shortly after acquisition and 
that such disposal resulted in a significant gain in profit. However, the court did not take the 
opportunity to analyse and discuss the reasons behind the sale. Rather, a prima facie approach 
was adopted which, it is submitted, is superficial in its application. The taxpayer demonstrated 
that there was never an intention to dispose of her home in order to make a profit. This was not 
the fundamental reason for the sale. The underlying reason was because the taxpayer could not 
afford to keep her home. This clearly indicates no business intention let alone a profit-making 
intention. The fact that a profit was subsequently earned should not affect the outcome of the 
matter as profits on capital disposal alone is not enough to render said proceeds revenue in 
nature.259 
The application of a purely objective test was also unfair to Wyner. A purely objective test 
does not afford an opportunity to the taxpayer to explain why a particular course of action was 
taken.  
As submitted earlier, the proper approach in an inquiry of this nature, it is submitted, is the 
adoption of a subjective test which is supported by objective factors.  
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The approach adopted in Wyner260 has not, however, been followed. The issue of the nature of 
a receipt was once more determined by the SCA in Capstone.261 The court herein adopted a 
subjective approach in reaching its decision. It is submitted that this is the correct approach that 
should never have been diverted from by Wyner.262 t is this subjective approach which this 
paper now seeks to analyse.  
 
CHAPTER 5 – A CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF CSARS v CAPSTONE 556 (PTY) LTD 
5.1. Introduction 
The decision in Wyner263 showed a move away from a subjective test to an objective test. The 
approach has been criticized in the preceding chapter as it fails to take into account the actual 
intention and purpose of the taxpayer. Further, the nature of the transaction is also not 
considered. The consequence of this narrow approach is that the true facts and circumstances 
of a particular transaction are not properly assessed. Therefore, whether or not a profit-making 
scheme was entered into falls to be determined on objective factors. This approach, it is 
submitted, is incorrect as there is no engagement with the background to the transaction under 
consideration. 
The capital or revenue nature of proceeds gained by a taxpayer was the subject of dispute in 
CSARS v Capstone 556 (Pty) Ltd.264 The court herein moved away from the approach in 
Wyner265 and determined the issue based on the subjective intention of the taxpayer. 
Capstone266 is of significance as it re-affirms the submission that the correct test when 
determining the capital or revenue nature of an asset should be subjective in nature.  
5.2. CSARS v Capstone analysed  
5.2.1. Facts 
Profurn Ltd (Profurn) ran into financial difficulties at the end of 2001. It had a debt with 
FirstRand Bank Ltd (FirstRand) in the sum of R900 million and it had owed Steinhoff 
International Holdings Ltd (Steinhoff) between R70 and R90 million. The liquidation of 
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Profurn was a major concern to its creditors. The chief executive officer of Profurn was Mr 
Jooste while the person responsible for Profurn’s account at FirstRand was Mr Lategan. 
Lategan and Jooste discussed the difficulties of Profurn and Lategan was referred by Jooste to 
Mr Daun. Daun also held a 13 per cent equity in Profurn. ‘FirstRand determined that Profurn 
needed to reduce its debt to them by R300 million in order to survive.’267 Lategan discussed 
this with Daun who was of the view that Profurn needed a cash injection and sound 
management to survive.  
Daun had known Mr Sussman whom he held in high regard. Sussman was the executive 
chairman of JDG. Daun advised that he would make the investment on condition that Sussman 
took over the management of Profurn. FirstRand then approached Sussman. Sussman agreed 
to take over the management of Profurn on condition that Daun commit to remain on board as 
a shareholder. Daun acceded to this request. The respective parties then attempted to rescue 
Profurn which would involve high risk and take between three to five years to accomplish.  
 
5.2.2. The rescue plan 
The agreement was that from the R900 million owing to First Rand, R600 million would be 
converted into shares with FirstRand underwriting a R600 million rights issue by Profurn. 
Profurn and JDG would then merge and the ‘Profurn shares would be exchanged for JDG 
shares.’268 FirstRand would then sell the newly acquired JDG shares for R600 million to a 
special purpose vehicle referred to as Capstone. Capstone would then be a beneficiary of an 
investment in the sum of R300 million. The investor was a company under the control of Daun. 
The investment would be used to settle half of the original purchase price of the shares. R200 
million of the balance would be settled by Capstone issuing to FirstRand redeemable preference 
shares. The balance of R100 million would be settled by way of a loan from FirstRand to 
Capstone.  
A memorandum of understanding was then signed by Daun which gave rise to a binding 
commitment by all the parties via Capstone.  
 
 
267 Note 20 above, para 4. 
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5.2.3. The memorandum of understanding 
The memorandum of understanding was subsequently amended with the result that FirstRand 
retained one sixth of its JDG shares. Five sixths, the equivalent of 35 million shares, were 
transferred to Capstone. Daun then invited Jooste to be a part of the transaction. ‘As a result, 
half of the 35 million shares were sold to Daun et Cie for R250 million and the other half to 
Capstone for the same price.’269 ‘Daun et Cie and Capstone were, therefore, committed to a 
large investment of indefinite duration.’270 ‘The profitability of the scheme depended on the 
ability of Sussman to turn around the operations of Profurn and integrate them profitably into 
those of JDG.’271  
5.2.4. Capstone incorporated 
Capstone was incorporated on 2 April 2003 and it was wholly owned by BVI. Gensec invested 
R150 million in BVI on condition that the funds be used by Capstone to acquire the JDG shares. 
This was subsequently reduced to a shareholder’s agreement between BVI and Capstone. The 
balance of the purchase price was settled by Capstone issuing redeemable preference shares to 
FirstRand. As a condition to this undertaking, Capstone was precluded from conducting any 
business until the preference shares were redeemed. Capstone, therefore, could not dispose of 
its JDG shares for three years from 30 May 2003 without the consent of FirstRand.  
‘There were two additional conditions attached to the acquisition of the JDG shares by 
Capstone.’272 ‘Firstly, a due diligence undertaking revealed liabilities for Profurn in respect of 
tax.’273 ‘JDG were to be indemnified of such liabilities by FirstRand.’274 ‘Secondly, the loan 
agreement between Gensec and BVI provided for an ‘equity kicker’.’275 ‘This was a portion of 
any gain in the market value of the JDG shares on the date of repayment of the loan.’276 ‘This 
was payable by BVI to Gensec irrespective of whether the JDG shares had been sold or not.’277  
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The merger was then eventually approved in December 2002. The JDG shares were paid for 
and transferred to Daun et Cie and Capstone on 5 December 2003. By this time, the share price 
had risen considerably.  
5.2.5. Disposal of shares 
A meeting was then held between Jooste and Mr Pagden of Citigroup. Citigroup subsequently 
made an offer to Daun for the purchase of his JDG shares, which was accepted by Daun. As a 
result, Daun et Cie and Capstone transferred 14 million shares each to Citigroup. Daun et Cie 
and Capstone retained 3,5 million shares each. Mayfair Speculators (Pty) Ltd purchased the 
balance of 3,5 million shares held by Capstone. In essence, Capstone had disposed of all its 
shares.  
On 30 April 2004, the directors of Capstone resigned. The loan was then settled by Gensec and 
BVI. The equity stood at R45 million. 
Capstone paid capital gains tax in respect of the proceeds gained from the disposal of the 17,5 
million JDG shares. However, the Commissioner issued an additional assessment in terms of 
which the proceeds were regarded as being revenue in nature. 
5.2.6. Issue 
Whether the profit made by Capstone from the sale of the shares was of a capital or revenue 
nature. 
5.2.7. Case law considered by the court  
In reaching their conclusion, the court considered a number of previous decisions wherein the 
capital or revenue nature of an asset was analysed.  
• Pick n’ Pay278 - The capital or revenue nature of an asset was to be determined by the 
facts of each case.279 There must be an analysis of what the taxpayer had intended and 
not what he had contemplated.280 
• Overseas Trust Corporation Ltd281 - Where a capital asset is disposed of for a value 
which had increased over a period of time, the proceeds thus received would still be of 
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a capital nature.282However, if the disposal was as a result of a business venture being 
pursued, the proceeds would then be income in nature.283  
• Stott284 - The mere act of cutting up land and selling same is not sufficient to stamp the 
proceeds received thereto as being revenue in nature.285 Rather, the gain must have been 
acquired by conducting a business in a scheme of profit-making.286 Further, there must 
be an assessment of other business transactions which the taxpayer engages in.287 
• Natal Estates288 - The taxpayer had crossed the Rubicon when land was developed and 
sold on a grand scale.289 Therefore, the land had been used as stock-in-trade with the 
result that the proceeds gained were deemed to be revenue in nature.290 
• Samril Investments (Pty) Ltd 291 – The test for the nature of a receipt is usually 
determined by inquiring whether the receipt constituted a gain made by carrying on a 
trade in a scheme of profit-making.292 Further, profit-making is an element of capital 
accumulation.293 Therefore, even if profits are sought in disposing of a capital asset, it 
did not mean that the profits were revenue in nature.294 Each case had to be determined 
on its own facts.295    
 The court held at paragraphs [31] and [32] that some of the factors to consider are: 
•  The intention of a taxpayer. 
•  ‘The nature of the business activities of the taxpayer.’296 
• ‘The period for which the asset was held and the period it was anticipated to be held at 
the time of acquisition.’297 
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• In commercial transactions, there may be no clear intention at the outset. Attempting to 
discern the correct intention may lead to inaccurate outcomes. Therefore, a better 
approach would be to accept the uncertainty and factor this into the inquiry.   
5.2.8. Subjective test applied 
In reaching their decision, it is significant to note that the court adopted a subjective approach. 
The court was of the view that given the commercial complexity of the matter, the entire 
agreement needed to be scrutinized as opposed to a narrow legalistic approach298. The court 
also assessed the events leading to the memorandum of understanding which further points to 
a subjective approach.  
5.2.9. Held 
In criticizing the decision of the Tax Court, the court held: 
• ‘The fact that Daun wanted to recover his investment, together with an increase in its 
value, did not equate to a profit-making intention at the time of his investment.’299 
• ‘There was no proof that the investment was not a long-term investment. The duration 
of the investment was dependent on Sussman’s skill in merging the two businesses as 
well as factors beyond the control of either himself of Daun, such as the general 
economic climate.’300 
• The full court was also criticized for failing to consider further implications of the 
investment. The court held that a complete consideration of the entire transaction was 
required.301  
• ‘The primary purpose for the acquisition of the shares was to rescue a business through 
investment.’302 ‘In order to achieve this, capital had to be committed for an 
indeterminate period of time with considerable risk.’303 Any possible return was 
unknown. What was to follow a successful business rescue was also uncertain as all 
options were opened. This is consistent with a capital investment which was realised 
sooner owing to skilled management and a favourable economic climate.304  
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The making of a profit on sale of the shares turned out to be one of the several options available 
to Daun. It was held, however, that the making of a profit on disposal of the shares when they 
were acquired was not inevitable for the following reasons: 
1. There was no guarantee that the business could rescued. This was dependent on 
Sussman’s managerial skills which may also give rise to a return on the investment, 
although not assured.305 
2. The proposed action was risky as Profurn faced impending insolvency.306 
3.  Daun had no idea how long the investment would take.307 
4. What was to follow a successful rescue was left undecided.308  
5. On the sale of the shares, the prospects to trade the block of shares were low.309 
6. Jooste strongly advised Daun not to sell the shares because their share price could 
increase. ‘Jooste only managed to persuade Daun to withdraw seven million shares 
from the book building exercise, half of which was acquired by Jooste through Mayfair 
Speculators (Pty) Ltd.’310 
7.  Daun’s wife urged him to sell his shares as he was overexposed in South Africa.311  
 
5.3. Analysis 
It is of importance to note that the court herein adopted a subjective approach in determining 
why the taxpayer had done what they did. It is submitted, that the reason for this approach was 
primarily because of the complexity of this matter. However, complexity alone is not the sole 
reason why this approach was followed. 
It is submitted that the court was forced to adopt a subjective approach because it is only with 
such application that a true analysis of the taxpayer’s intention can follow. 
A pure objective test may have resulted in the court accepting that the taxpayer sought to make 
a profit which is why disposal occurred. However, the fundamental reason why the sale ensued 
was not in pursuit of earning profits. 
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The court also assessed the fundamental reason why the scheme was started, which was to 
rescue a business and not to earn any profits.  
5.4. Conclusion 
The author accepts the decision of Capstone.312 The court highlighted the importance of 
assessing the subjective intention of a taxpayer when determining the nature of an asset. This 
was plainly stated by the court when it was accepted that a legalistic approach would be too 
narrow in its application given the complexity of this matter. 
Prior to disposal occurring, the court also went back and discussed at length the reasons for 
acquisition of the shares. This approach is accepted by the author as it indicates that a holistic 
approach of the entire transaction, must be assessed to determine whether a business motive in 
a scheme of profit-making was ever intended.   
The court also assessed what the taxpayer had done following acquisition to determine whether 
their intention at acquisition was carried forth during the time that the shares were held. This 
is also accepted by the author as it indicates that the intention at acquisition must also be 
assessed during the time the asset was held. If the taxpayer states that he had a capital intention 
at acquisition but his actions during the time the asset is held demonstrates a business motive, 
then profits subsequently earned on disposal will be of a revenue nature. This is because the 
character of the asset would have been changed by the actions taken by the taxpayer.  
It is submitted that the above shows a subjective approach which was reaffirmed by objective 
factors. This approach is preferred by the author when determining the capital or revenue nature 
of an asset.  
 
CHAPTER 6 – CONCLUSION 
6.1. Historical case law 
The historical approach in ‘determining the capital or revenue nature of an asset’ provided little 
certainty for taxpayers and academics. 
There were many cases which addressed the issue but with each having a different approach. 
Historically, it is submitted, that the three cases which provide the most guidance were Stott,313 
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John Bell314 and Natal Estates.315 These cases clearly indicated a subjective approach. 
However, a subjective approach as not accepted by these courts without regard to the argument 
of the Commissioner. The stated intention of the taxpayer was still tested against objective 
factors to determine whether the asset was truly capital in nature or whether the taxpayer had 
engaged in business in a scheme of profit-making.  
These cases provided key factors which form the basis of an inquiry of this nature. They also 
provided boundaries to the liberties granted to a taxpayer when disposing of an asset. This was 
evident from Natal Estates316 which shows that inasmuch as Stott317 and John Bell318 allow 
taxpayers to make profitable disposals, there is only so far that he can go before having 
proceeds earned being subject to normal tax. This is accepted as a fair concession as the fiscus 
cannot be prohibited from taxing citizens from clear business dealings resulting in unfettered 
profitable gains.  
6.2. The formation of a test 
Inasmuch as factors provide guidance, legal tests provide certainty. Pick n’ Pay319 brought 
together the various judicial precedents and the factors and guidelines expounded from them. 
The case highlighted the importance of not accepting profit-making alone as a reason for 
deeming receipts revenue in nature. The inquiry must proceed further and there must be an 
assessment of the actions of a taxpayer and why these actions were undertaken. 
The scheme of profit-making test proved to be a fair test which would provide an opportunity 
for a taxpayer to state his ipse dixit and this would then be tested against objective factors. This 
holistic approach is accepted by the author and accords with Stott,320 John Bell321 and Natal 
Estates.322  
6.3. The move to a purely objective test 
The approach followed by Wyner323 seemed at odds with what has been decided previously. 
The court failed to take into account the intention of the taxpayer at acquisition, the reasons for 
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the disposal and the background of the taxpayer. It is submitted that if the court assessed any 
one of these avenues, the next would have followed naturally. The outcome of this analysis, it 
is submitted, would have indicated a capital disposal as opposed to a business in a scheme of 
profit-making. The reason for this submission is because: 
• The reduced purchase price was determined by the Council and not sought for by the 
taxpayer. 
• The purchase and resale occurred because the taxpayer could not afford to purchase the 
property on her own and she could not afford to pay rental at market rates going 
forward.  
• The profits earned by the taxpayer were used to purchase another home in which she 
lived and the balance was invested by herself.  
• The taxpayer had not engaged in any business dealings prior to this transaction.  
6.4. Reverting to a subjective test  
The approach adopted by Capstone,324 it is submitted, remedied the defective approach adopted 
by Wyner.325 The matter showed a clear subjective test which was informed by objective 
factors. 
The ipse dixit of the taxpayer was not accepted without scrutiny. There was a clear analysis of 
the actions taken by the taxpayer. This amplifies that point that the correct test when 
determining the capital or revenue nature of an asset is subjective in nature. Thereafter, the 
facts enunciated when employing a subjective test, must be tested and supported against 
objective factors.  
In the final analysis it is clear ‘that the test for determining the capital or revenue nature of an 
asset for income tax purposes’ was not formulated in 1992, 2003 or 2016. Rather, the test and 
application was provided decades ago in 1928 in the decision of Stott.326 All that was achieved 
in the intervening 88 years was to create confusion on settled and accepted principles.  
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